What we (0) CHOOSE to attend to, more than what we consciously believe, shapes the contours of our moral life. A person may the noblest principles and yet, through the quiet economy of attention, reserve them for occasions so rare that they might as well gone unheld. Conversely, an unremarkable life spent reliably noticing the small sufferings of others may amount, in the end, to a act of virtue, even when no principle has been articulated in its defence. This suggests that ethics is less a matter of doctrine than of orientation: a steady tuning of perception towards the things that merit it. The implication is uncomfortable for traditions that moral worth on stated commitments, since it locates the weight of character in a faculty scarcely open to introspection. We do not, for the most part, choose what catches our eye; we the cast of attention we have been given by temperament and training. To recognise this is not to responsibility but to relocate it, directing moral effort towards the slow, deliberate of one's own gaze.